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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
itable corporation will be held liable for the torts of its mere servants
and agents but not for those whom the court considers to be inde-
pendent contractors.56
ROBERT I. RUBACK.
RIGHTS OF HOLDERS OF PREFERRED STOCK TO DIVIDENDS IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS TO COMMON
STOCKHOLDERS.
A legal problem arises when the certificate of incorporation or
other certificate creates preferred stock, entitling the holder to a
specific preferential dividend before anything is paid to the common
stockholders, but contains no provision whatever respecting its right
to share in any surplus profit in excess of the stipulated dividend.Y
Three different accountings can be made of the surplus in the dis-
tribution of dividends in such event. 1. The preferred will receive its
stipulated dividend; the common will receive an equal share and the
balance will be divided pro rata between both classes. 2. The pre-
ferred will receive its stipulated dividend, and the common will re-
ceive the balance even though it may be in excess of the amount paid
to the preferred. 3. The preferred will receive its stipulated dividend
and then share with the common in the balance, so that the preferred
will always get the greater share to the extent of its preference.2
The problem can be framed simply. Does the preferred stockholder,
in the absence of a contractual provision, have any right at all to
participate in the distribution of the dividend fund, after it has been
paid the amount of the preference?
Two theories have been adopted by the courts in arriving at a
solution. 1. The preferred stockholder presumptively yields nothing
in compensation for the benefits he receives; that he has and holds
Doctors, nurses, professors, instructors, etc.
It is interesting to note that since this article has been submitted for publi-
cation, one similar to it has been published in 12 IND. L. J. 96 and reprinted in
the New York Law Journal of Nov. 13, 1937 under the heading of "The Lia-
bility of Charitable Corporations for Torts of Servants". The author, building
his article around Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y.
163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28 (1937), arrives at practically the same conclusion as the
present writer. He states that "There is ample reason to believe that other
courts will be influenced by this present view (to apply the doctrine of respondeat
superior to charitable corporations where the tort is committed by a mere
employee while acting in that capacity) because New York decisions are con-
sidered to be the leading authorities in this branch of law".
112 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. (Perm, ed.) § 5448.
' Thompson, Respective Rights of Preferred and Common Stockholders in
Surplus Profits (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv. 463.
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all the rights of the common stockholder and in addition has his pref-
erential rights. This may be called the Pennsylvania rule. 2. The
preferred stockholder, in receiving greater security of his preferential
rights, impliedly agrees to accept such rights in lieu of equal partici-
pation and the fact that this theory is the one that is accepted by busi-
ness men. This may be called the English rule. 3
The first case on this problem was decided in Maryland in 1901. 4
The previously existing preferred stockholders of the defendant cor-
poration were entitled, according to the language of their certificates,
to a "perpetual dividend of six per centum per annum and no more."
The reorganization agreement provided that "the preferred stock
should be entitled to receive any dividend declared by the directors,
up to, but not exceeding four per cent per annum, before any divi-
dends shall be set apart or paid upon the common stock." In an
action by a preferred stockholder who wanted to share with the com-
mon above his four per cent, the court said that "if the words, not
exceeding, did not constitute a limitation upon the dividend rights of
the preferred stock, then the words were meaningless." 5 Great em-
phasis was placed upon the fact that this issue of preferred stock was
put on the market due to a reorganization and that the men who de-
vised the system of reorganization could not have meant that the
preferred should share with the common as the plaintiff contended. 6
'Stone v. United States Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536 (1920).
Compare Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918) (which sets
forth the Pennsylvania rule) with Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co. [1912]
2 Ch. 571 (giving the English rule). See also Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 466.
'Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl. 327 (1901).
'Although at first blush it would seem that "not exceeding" meant just
that, the argument of the court is criticized in a leading article by Mr. Christ,
Rights of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the Distribution of
Profits (1927) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 731, He believes the language to be ambig-
uous. It may mean no more than four per cent either before or after any
dividends are paid to the common or it may mean no more than four per cent
until after the common get four per cent.
No cases were cited by the court in its decision and it was admitted that
none could be found on the point. The court went on to say, however, that
"the plaintiff's argument (that the preferred share with the common after the
common get four per cent) can be supported by cogent reasoning, yet, in a case
like this, where so much exactness of detail is observable in the plan, where
the interests involved are so great, it would be most unreasonable to assume
that, when the schedule for the issue of 40 million dollars of preferred stock
was included in the plan, everything was not put there that the parties intended
should be there." It was insisted by the plaintiff that the fact that the old pre-
ferred read six per cent and no more and the new preferred omitted "and no
more" was significant in indicating the intention of the parties. The court, how-
ever, found that the omission of the words "and no more" was of no significance
whatever. The pre-existing preferred stock was issued to conform with the
requirements of the statutes of 1868 and 1835. Both statutes contained the
words "no more" and it was proper that they should be there, so that the
intention of the Legislature should be clearly expressed. Here the preferred
stock was issued with the assent of all the stockholders and to carry out the
plan of reorganization.
19371
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In 1909, the case of Sternbergh v. Brock was decided in Penn-
sylvania.7 By resolution, it was provided that "the preferred stock
of the defendant corporation should be entitled to receive a cumula-
tive yearly dividend of five per cent, before any dividends shall be
set apart or paid on the common stock." The plaintiff, who was a
holder of the common stock, filed a bill in equity alleging that the
preferred stockholders were not entitled to receive more than five per
cent per annum and praying the court to enjoin the payment of any
dividend in excess of that amount. Held, where there is no stipula-
tion in the contract to the contrary, the weight of authority clearly
favors the right of preferred stockholders to share with the common
stockholders in all profits distributed, after the latter have received
an amount equal to the stipulated dividend on the preferred stock.8
Opposed to this Pennsylvania decision, the leading English case
on this point, Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., was decided in
1912. 9 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Chancery
Division and held that the preferred stockholders were entitled only
to the stipulated preference. The court argued that "it is reasonable
to believe that one who is receiving a preference as to dividends is
thereby promising in return to give up all rights to dividends in ex-
cess *of his preference and that it is generally so regarded by business
men." "They (the attorneys for the preferred shareholders)", con-
tinued the court, "treat shares as though they were born into the
world, all equal; and as if preferences was a kind of subsequent at-
tachment to them; but the whole of the attributes of a preference share
are limited and defined on its birth. One cannot be aware to any
extent of what goes on on the Stock Exchange without knowing that
preferential shares and stock are ordinarily spoken of and regarded,
as shares or stock which carry a fixed preferential dividend, and are
not entitled to anything more."
In the same year, the federal court had an opportunity to discuss
the problem and agreed with the English courts. 10 The case involved
the construction of a New Jersey statute which provided that "pre-
ferred stockholders are entitled to a fixed yearly dividend, not ex-
ceeding eight per cent, which is to be paid before any dividend can
be declared on the common." It was held that the surplus profits
belonged to the common stockholders. "The common stockholder",
Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Atl. 166 (1909). Accord: Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 215 Pa. 610, 64 Atl. 829 (1906). Followed
later in Sterling v. Watson Co., 241 Pa. 105, 88 Atl. 297 (1913) ; Englander v.
Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918).
' Thompson, op. cit. supra note 2, asks, "What authorities?" Since up to
this time there were only two cases decided on this point, one in Pennsylvania
for the proposition and one in Maryland, against, he says, "this statement might
only have been a judicial smoke-cloud."
'Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co. [1912] 2 Ch. 573, aff'd [19141
A. C. 11.
"Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), cert.
denied, 231 U. S. 748, 34 Sup. Ct. 320 (1913).
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said the court, "bears substantially all the losses of adversity and are
entitled to the gains of prosperity. We find nothing in the law of the
certificate or in the past action of the defendant to indicate that any-
one connected with the business supposed that the preferred stock-
holders were to share equally with the common stockholders in the
division of surplus earnings." 11
Stock Dividends.
The problem can be further complicated by the declaration of a
stock dividend rather than one in cash. The owner of preferred stock
may find his power of control injured and his capital interest lessened
if the court decides that he is limited only to his stated preference.
In Stone v. United States Envelope Co.12 the preferred shareholders
were denied the right to subscribe to an issue of common stock on
the same terms as the common shareholders, because the preferred
stock provided that the preferred stockholders should receive seven
per cent per annum before any dividends were declared on the com-
mon. As the new stock was offered at a price below its value, the
common stockholders argued it was, in effect, a dividend, and that
the preferred shareholders had no right to subscribe. This conten-
tion was upheld. Business custom and the sentiment of the ordinary
investor as to cash dividends was relied upon by the court as reason
for limiting the preferred to the stipulated preference and applied this
same reasoning to a stock dividend. The same rule, which led to a
peculiar result, was applied in the federal court in Niles v. Ludlow
Valve Mfg. Co.,'3 discussed above. The plaintiff, owner of 100 shares
of eight per cent preferred stock, brought suit to be allowed to par-
ticipate in a stock dividend. He lost and the preferred shareholders
were lowered to a minority standing in voting power, whereas before
the dividend they had a majority. The point of voting power, how-
ever, was not raised in the case.14
' Contra: Star Publishing Co. v. Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285 (1922).
In this case, the Indiana court, in construing one of their statutes similar to
that of New Jersey, decided that this meant that after dividends are paid on
the common, preferred stock may participate in dividends to any amount. "The
preferred stockholder," said the court, "is as much a party to this business
venture as the common stockholder, and is entitled to all the rights of the
common stockholder, except as modified by statute and contract."
22 Stone v. United States Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536 (1920).
The by-laws of the corporation read: "The preferred shares shall be entitled
to cumulative dividends payable out of the net earnings of the corporation at
the rate of seven per cent per annum, before any dividends are declared or
paid on the common shares."
'Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), cert.
denied, 231 U. S. 748, 34 Sup. Ct. 320 (1913).
" Rowell, Rights of Preferred Shareholders in Excess of Preference (1935)
19 Minx. L. REv. 406 ("the dividend changed the position of the preferred
from that of carrying the whip hand in the ratio of 4 to 3, to that of a minority
1937 ]
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Realizing that the decisions in these two cases were not fair to
the preferred stockholder, the Virginia court decided that the pre-
ferred stockholder should be allowed to participate in stock dividends,
even in face of an express limitation of rights to dividends, whenever
a denial of such participation "will disturb the equilibrium of voting
power" or wherever necessary "to protect its rights on dissolution." 15
In the Virginia case, a preferred stockholder, in spite of the fact
that the preferred certificate entitled him to a six per cent dividend
and no other, sued his corporation for damages sustained by him be-
cause of its refusal to divide with the preferred stockholders a stock
dividend of twenty-five per cent issued to the common. He argued
that both his voting rights and his rights to share in the assets were
impaired by the issue of the stock dividend. Held, for the plaintiff.
"It is true", said the court, "that the preferred stockholders were
entitled to no dividends in excess of six per cent, and that the residue
of the profits might, if deemed for the best interest of the corporation,
be paid to the common stockholders in cash dividend. But the board
of directors had no authority to declare a stock dividend, in whole or
in part in favor of, or sell the new stock exclusively to, the holders
of the common stock. The reason is obvious. A cash dividend is
essentially different from a stock dividend. The distribution of the
former in no way prejudices the rights of the preferred stockholder
while the distribution of the latter to the common stockholders seri-
ously affects his interest in the corporation." 16
The latest case on this point is Tennant v. Epstein, decided by the
Illinois court in 1934.17 Here, the preferred stock was preferred as
to assets upon dissolution and seven per cent on dividends. In 1929,
a stock dividend was declared; one share of common for each share
of common or preferred. Immediately following this issue of com-
mon, a cash dividend was declared on all common stock, which in
effect gave the original preferred shareholders a dividend of seven per
cent on their preferred, plus the dividend on the common. The plain-
tiff, a common stockholder, filed a bill in equity praying for a can-
cellation of the common stock which formed the stock dividend and
for the repayment of the cash dividend thereon to the corporation.
The decree was granted and the directors were enjoined from paying
more than seven per cent per annum on preferred stock. Said the
standing in the ratio of 2 to 3"). See also Morawetz, The Preemptive Right
of Shareholders (1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 186.
'Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Branch & Co., 139 Va. 291,
123 S. E. 542 (1924) ; idem, 147 Va. 509, 137 S. E. 620 (1927). The preferred
stock certificate read "said stock shall not entitle holder thereof to receive out
of the profits of the Company, any greater or other dividend than said six per
cent annually." This case discussed by Rowell, Rights of Preferred Sharehold-
ers in Excess of Preference (1935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 406.
"Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Branch & Co., 139 Va. 291,
310, 123 S. E. 552, 547 (1924).
'Tennant v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26, 189 N. E. 864 (1934); (1934) 83 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 91; (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REV. 439.
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court: "We think that Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co.,'8 Niles V.
Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co.,19 and Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co. 20
are in accord with business usage and the expectation of investors
when they purchase shares of stock. The preferences stated in the
stock certificate are a delimitation of the rights of preferred stock-
holders. The majority of stockholders in voting power cannot de-
prive common stockholders of cash dividends by withholding divi-
dends on such stocks, piling up a surplus, and indefinitely voting to
themselves stock dividends not provided for in the articles of in-
corporation."
Conclusion.
The essential difference between the Pennsylvania rule and the
English rule seems to lie in the truth of the hypothesis upon which
the respective views are based-either that in the absence of express
provisions one way or the other, diversified classes of stock are born
equal, or are in their very creation subject to preferences or limita-
tions.21  Basically, it would appear that the preferred stockholders'
contract is that of the common stockholder, plus any preferential
rights given him by the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the logi-
cal result is to consider that preferred stockholders are entitled to
share equally (saving any express affirmative or negative provisions
in the contract) with the common stock in any dividends paid after
the preferred dividend, and an equal amount as a common dividend.2 2
The preferred stockholder is as much a party to the business venture
as the common stockholder, except as modified by statute or contract.
There is nothing inherent in the nature of a preferred stock which
should imply a waiver of any rights the result of which is to classify
such stock as inferior to the common issue.23 A stock preferred as
to dividends merely stipulates what one class of holders is entitled to
Stone v. United States Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536 (1920).
"Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), cert.
denied, 231 U. S. 748, 34 Sup. Ct. 320 (1913).
'0Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co. [1912] 2 Ch, 573, aff'd [1914]
A. C. 11.
Thompson, op. cit. supra note 2.
"Note (1936) 16 BOSTON U. L. REv. 189. In Englander v. Osborne, 261
Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918), the court quoted approvingly 2 CLARK AND MAP-
SHALL, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1901) § 417c: "In the absence of special pro-
visions, the holders of preferred stock in a corporation are in precisely the
same position, both with respect to the corporation itself and with respect to
the creditors of the corporation as the holders of the common stock, except only
that they are entitled to receive dividends on their shares, to the extent guaran-
teed or agreed upon, before any dividends can be paid to the holders of the
common stock."TNote (1935) 7 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 73 ("why should courts of law bow
to public ignorance and change the whole concept of corporate ownership to
cover up poor draughtmanship?").
1937 ]
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receive before the other class shall be entitled to anything. It becomes
a matter of priority in time as to declaration of dividends. One must
be declared before the other. Therefore, it does not seem that a mere
preference as to time of payment should operate as a limitation upon
the total amount of dividend to which the preferred stock can be-
come entitled.2 4
If the assumption is true, that business men buy preferred stock
under the belief that they will be limited to the amount of their prefer-
ence, it does not follow that it is true that the right to receive divi-
dends above the amount of the preference is lost merely because most
men think it lost.25  The priority of the preferred stockholder rests
upon the contract and beyond the provisions of such contract they
occupy no position toward the company different from that of the
holders of common stock.26  Since both Pennsylvania and England
agree that this type of contract is not ambiguous and should be inter-
preted within its four corners, courts should render inadmissable ex-
trinsic evidence of the actualities of the business world, since, theo-
retically, there remains nothing doubtful requiring explanation.
But the majority of our courts do not follow this reasoning. In
place of theory, the common-sense understanding of the business man
is adopted, and the contract interpreted by what both parties thought
it meant.27  The argument that rights once acquired cannot be lost
by thinking them so does not permit the interpretation given to the
contract by the contracting parties. The question is whether a right
is ever acquired, when the contracting parties understand their words
as negativing such a right. The business man's view is therefore
evidence of what the contracting parties had agreed. Trading a right
to a pro rata share in all earnings in return for a prior right to a
specified ratio of earnings is reasonable. 28
No New York cases have been decided on this point.2 9  The
Christ, Rights of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the Dis-
tribution of Profits (1929) 27 MicH. L. REV. 731.
Ibid.
Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918).
Following the dicta laid down in Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93
Md. 475, 49 At. 327 (1901), the Maryland court in James F. Powers Foundry
Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 590, 171 Atl. 842 (1934) again held that "in view of
what we regard is the common understanding of the investing public, it is the
opinion of this court that the sound rule is, unless otherwise provided, that the
preferred stock dividends are limited to the rate prescribed by the charter of
the issuing corporation, and stated in the certificate." The preferred stockhold-
ers, in this case, every year received their six per cent, but the common stock-
holders in 1926 received a dividend of 430%, and in 1927 and 1928 received
150%.
'Rowell, Rights of Preferred Shareholders in Excess of Preference
(1935) 19 MINN. L. REV. 406.
'The case of Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co., 201 App. Div. 141,
205 N. Y. Supp. 511 (4th Dept. 1924), aff'd, 240 N. Y. 592, 148 N. E. 719
(1924), is cited by STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) § 107, p. 419, as sustaining
the proposition that New York follows the Pennsylvania rule. In Lockwood
v. General Abrasive Co. the certificate of incorporation provided that the pre-
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Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange would
require before listing a preferred stock that the stock disclose just
what its preferences are in excess profits. To date the problem has
never arisen on the New York Stock Exchange and the views of the
members and traders of the Exchange cannot be ascertained.
The question may still be considered an open one.30 The Vir-
ginia court sums up the problem by saying:
"I do not think that either rule can be gathered from the
decisions of the courts as a maxim of the law applicable to all
cases. It may be that in some cases the failure to make any
provision as to participating in excess dividends would natu-
rally be construed as granting such participation, while in
other cases the failure to make such provisions would be held
as a denial of participation. That question must be decided
in the light of all the language of the contract, giving effect to
every provision in it, and construing it in the light of the cir-
cumstances in which the parties stood." 3'
SAMUEL LEVINE.
ILLUSORY ASPECT OF CORPORATE CONTRACT TO REPURCHASE STOCK.
The New York Penal Law 1 declares, "A director of a stock
corporation who concurs in any vote or act of the directors of such
corporation, or any of them by which it is intended * * * 5. to apply
any portion of the funds of such corporation except surplus, directly
or indirectly to the purchase of shares of its own stock is guilty of a
misdemeanor". The Penal Law is naturally construed as permitting
a corporation to purchase its own shares from surplus.2 A majority
ferred were entitled to receive seven per cent cumulative dividends and the
common stock to receive annual dividends of seven per cent, any surplus to be
distributed pro rata to preferred and common. The question raised was whether
the common shareholders were entitled to cumulative dividends before the two
classes became entitled to participate equally. Held, that the contract does not
so provide, citing Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918).
But in Pennsylvania the rule had been laid down that the preferred stockholders
share with the common in excess profits in the absence of any provision nega-
tiving such intent. In Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co. the certificate of
incorporation expressly provided for such participation. The case merely holds,
therefore, that the preferred are entitled to all arrearages (being cumulative)
before the common get their annual dividend and then both classes share.
1 CooK, CORPORATIONS (6th ed.) § 269.
'Lyman v. Southern Ry., 149 Va. 274, 141 S. E. 240 (1928).
'PENAL LAW c. 40, § 664.
'Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosive Co., 258 Fed. 66 (S. D. N. Y.
1918) ; In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; Richards
v. Weiner, 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y.
262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
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